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Let's Put Ourselves Out of Business: On




This Essay works in two steps. I want to daydream with you about
the future, or what I hope will someday be the future, of our dispute
resolution movement. I want to then use these imaginings to reflect upon
where we are today.
Many of you, especially those who examine tensions between
empathy and assertiveness in negotiation, are aware of Rabbi Hillel's
three famous questions from roughly two thousand years ago: "If I am
not for myself, who is for me? When I am for myself only, what am I?
And if not now, when?"' His questions come from a work of wisdom
literature titled, Pirkei Avot, The Ethics of the Fathers. In thinking about
the development of our movement, it is helpful to consider another triad
of questions offered in that same work by one of his contemporaries,
Akavya ben Mahalalel. "Concentrate on three things... [k]now from
where you came, where you are going, and before Whom you
[ultimately] will have to give account and reckoning. 2 It is his third
topic that I would like to take up, albeit in secular paraphrase. When
we-and here I mean "we" in a very broad sense-look back at our
movement generations from now, what would we like to be able to say
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1. MISHNAH, PIRKEI AVOT 1:14, translated in ETHICS OF THE SAGES: AN INTERFAITH
COMMENTARY ON PIRKEi AVOT 39 (Ronald W. Pies, trans., 2000).
2. MISHNAH, PIRKEI AVOT 3:1, translated in ETHICS OF THE SAGES: AN INTERFAITH
COMMENTARY ON PIRKEI AVOT, supra note 1, at 127.
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about it? Put differently, what is the ideal vision for which we who
practice and teach dispute resolution should strive?
3
I want to suggest something that may at first seem odd: Our
ultimate goal should be to put ourselves, or virtually put ourselves, out of
business. Eventually, I hope the time will come when we live in a
society where the expert services of dispute resolution professionals,
including not only lawyers and judges but also mediators and arbitrators,
are rarely needed.4 Think by analogy to the field of medicine. The best
scenario from a medical viewpoint is not that a doctor helps you to heal
quickly when you get sick, but that you do not get sick in the first place.
Preventative rather than remedial medicine is the ideal.
The same can be said about our field. The ideal is to have a society
where: (A) members avoid injuring one another so there is little conflict
to begin with; (B) when injuries do occur, injurers actively take
responsibility and seek to make amends; and (C) when conflicts arise, the
parties attempt to resolve their differences themselves through direct
dialogue and reasonable accommodation. (A) and (B) can be thought of
as pure conflict prevention; (C) represents private conflict resolution by
the parties. Invoking professional conflict handlers, necessary as it may
be in some cases, should be extremely rare.
A society such as ours with enough conflict to employ roughly one
million lawyers is running a high fever. Even if we decrease our
reliance on litigation and increase our reliance on mediation, which will
be better, there will still be a fever, just a lower fever.6 Ultimately, what
we want is a healthy society with little need for both lawyers and
mediators. Though adverse to our professional economic interests, one
of our ultimate goals should be to make ourselves largely dispensable.
What will it take to bring about this idealistic vision? If reading,
writing, and arithmetic are the three basic skills we teach children,
respect, responsibility, and dialogue are three essentials that must be
promoted within our society when it comes to conflict prevention and
3. Professor David Sally calls this our field's ultimate "aspiration point." Professor
David Sally, Presentation at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law
Dispute Resolution Symposium (Apr. 11, 2003) (transcript on file with the Penn State
Law Review).
4. This is a long-run goal. I am not arguing for reducing the use of mediators in the
short-run. Increasing the use of mediators in the short-run may well be a helpful
intermediate step toward decreasing the long-run need for them.
5. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990S 1 (1994) (projecting approximately one
million American lawyers by 2000).
6. "Better" is a very broad term. For differing philosophical assessments of
litigation and mediation, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
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private resolution. Here I refer not just to children, but to adults. Let me
explain each.
1I. Respect, Responsibility, and Dialogue
By respect, I do not mean the fear of power or authority. Rather, I
mean respecting people as people, that is, as seeing and treating them as
beings with fundamental dignity.7 Most apparently, it means the
"negative" practice of refraining from harming others. There is no more
basic cross-cultural value than not injuring others. When asked which
was the greatest of the commandments, Jesus responded first to love God
and second to "love your neighbor as yourself. On these two
commandments depend all the law and prophets." 8  When asked to
summarize the Torah, Rabbi Hillel responded with the "negative"
Golden Rule: "What is hateful to thee, do not unto thy fellow; this is the
whole law. All the rest is a commentary to this law; go and learn it." 9
When asked whether there was a single word that could serve as a
principle of conduct for life, Confucius replied, "Sympathy... what you
don't want [done to] yourself, don't inflict on another."' 0  Similar
examples exist within other religious and ethical traditions. As the
psychologist Jean Piaget wrote: "[A]uthors of the most diverse
inspirations find themselves in agreement on one point ... the sentiment
most characteristic of moral life is the feeling of respect.""l The more
people respect one another, the fewer injuries and hence fewer conflicts
there will be in the first place.
12
Next comes responsibility. By responsibility, I do not mean a broad
set of moral duties. Rather, I mean a specific course of action, namely,
an injurer actively taking responsibility after harming another. If the
basic moral axiom is "[d]o not harm others," surely the first corollary to
that axiom is to take responsibility if you do. Apologize for the harm
7. See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 760, 768 (2001).
8. Matthew 22:39-40 (Revised Standard Version).
9. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Tract Sabbath 3 I a, translated in BABYLONIAN TALMUD
50 (Isaac M. Wise ed., 1918).
10. CONFUCIAN ANALECTS 103 (Ezra Pound trans., 1933).
11. JEAN PIAGET, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES 169 (Leslie Smith ed., 1995).
12. The analysis of conflict here begins prior to the "injurious experience" often
taken as the starting point for analysis. See, e.g., William Felstiner et al., The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
631, 633 (1981); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 13 (1983). I understand conflict prevention as beginning
with injury prevention. While often for analytical purposes the existence of injury or
conflict is quite properly taken as a "given," and the question then becomes how to
handle that injury or conflict, I do not take it as a simple "given" here.
2003]
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and seek to make amends.13 Frequently this will include offering fair
compensation. 14 To see how far astray from this moral practice we are
now, consider the contrast between how we teach children and how we
teach adults to respond to harms they commit. If a child injures another,
good parents will teach the child to take responsibility for her actions. If
an adult injures another and goes to a lawyer, the usual focus is on
precisely the reverse: denial.15 The goal is to avoid responsibility, or if
that is not possible, minimize liability. This pattern is not only morally
bizarre, but it is likely psychologically and spiritually harmful to the
injurer in the long run. Unlike the defense attorney, a minister or
psychologist would typically urge an injurer to face the results of the
injurious conduct and to take responsibility for it. Ultimately, we must
change from being a society where denying the injuries we commit is the
norm, to one where taking responsibility is the norm. Injurers need to
learn to place morality above money. The moral lesson we teach
children is also the one we should practice as adults.
If people respected one another more, the level of injuries, and
hence the level of conflict, would decrease. If injurers took, rather than
denied, responsibility for their actions, the level of conflict would also
decrease. Yet some conflicts would still remain. Sometimes conflicts
arise without injury, as when a divorcing couple whose marriage fails
through the fault of neither must reach a child custody arrangement.
Sometimes the parties are unclear about who was at fault or precisely to
what extent. Sometimes parties are simply angry at one another. What
the parties typically then ought to attempt is to engage in a respectful
dialogue in which they listen to one another and seek a fair solution to
their predicament.' 6 Though this would not resolve all such disputes, it
would resolve many of them. Only if such a private process failed would
the services of dispute resolution professionals then be invoked.
The three steps of respect, responsibility, and dialogue would not
fully eliminate the need for dispute resolution professionals, but they
would greatly reduce it. If followed, the lion's share of disputes that
13. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1036-39 (1999).
14. For examples of the practice of offering fair compensation, see Jonathan R.
Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1453, 1460 (2000).
15. See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial (forthcoming).
16. I write "typically" because many see private dispute resolution as inappropriate
in certain cases, including those with gross power imbalances, such as domestic violence,
or important constitutional or public law dimensions. See Harry Edwards, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Lisa G.
Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
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require professionals for resolution would disappear. The need for
dispute resolution professionals is deeply interwoven with our underlying
culture, in particular with our cultural lack of respect, responsibility, and
dialogue. 17 The spread of respect, responsibility, and dialogue would
represent not only a significant advance in dispute resolution practice but
also in the moral consciousness and development of society.
III. Dispute Resolution Today
This brings me to my second topic: reflecting upon our current
dispute resolution practices through these idealistic lenses, that is,
through the lenses of respect, responsibility, and dialogue. The caution
against seeing the world through rose-colored glasses notwithstanding,
donning tinted lenses can sometimes assist us by reducing glare, thus
allowing us to focus on essential features of what we now do and should
attempt to do.
Consider a few examples. Hiring calm attorneys to negotiate can
help disputants who cannot speak without shouting to reach a
settlement.18  The respect they cannot show on their own, they can
sometimes show through their agents. Mediators often foster respect
(think of cautions against name-calling), responsibility taking (think of
"reality checking" and efforts to facilitate apologies), 9 and most
basically dialogue. Observe also the emphasis on voice (being heard)
and respect in the procedural justice literature.2 ° On a practical level, the
idealistic lenses of respect, responsibility, and dialogue can help us better
understand what dispute resolution professionals are doing and should
do.
Such lenses may also help us better see what dispute resolution
professionals do on a deeper, conceptual level. I would hypothesize that
a core function of dispute resolution professionals, in particular
mediators, is to promote those very traits-respect, responsibility, and
17. For one fine cross-cultural comparison see Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett,
The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 461 (1986) (contrasting the
prevalence of apology to help resolve disputes in Japan with its rare use in America).
18. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 542-43
(1994) (discussing the potential of detached attorneys to add value to the negotiation
process).
19. See Deborah Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165
(1997).
20. For references, see Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A
Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 887, 891
(1997). On the application of procedural justice concerns to mediation, see Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001).
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dialogue-the absence of which helped trigger or escalate the dispute.
Broadly speaking, dispute resolution efforts like mediation may be
understood as society's way of introducing behaviors that should have
been there in the first place.21 At its best, mediation is a form of moral
"civic education" providing "for both parties, a direct education and
growth experience, as to self-determination on the one hand and
consideration for others on the other" thereby fostering in participants
"responsibility for themselves and respect for others." 22  (Of course,
mediators do other things too; most apparently, they often help achieve
settlements, the central goal of many court-annexed mediation
programs.) 23  Traditional litigation too can be seen as responding to
deficits. If lawful behavior is the ideal, judges and juries can be viewed
as helping to impart a value, lawfulness, the absence of which triggered
the case. Such agents can be seen as conduits for fostering those ideal
values in a less-than-ideal world. The response mirrors the actor's
deficiencies. As when disciplining a child, one hopes that the external
discipline will help to impart to that child the internal discipline the child
lacks. In criminal law, there is a slogan of making the "punishment fit
the crime." In dispute resolution, we often speak of "fitting the forum to
the fuSS." ' 24  We should understand this not only narrowly, that is, as
selecting the most appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for a
21. A proactive variant of this is ombuds practice, where an organization seeks to
institutionally embody the value of problem solving. Note, however, that ombuds offices
are often formed in response to organizational problems.
22. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and
Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11-12, 18
(1989-1990) (emphasis added). See also Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305,325 (1971) ("[T]he central quality of mediation [is] the
capacity to reorient the parties toward one another.. . [to] redirect their attitudes and
dispositions toward one another."). Note that Bush identifies the two key values of
respect and responsibility with mediation; he does not explicitly mention the value of
dialogue. Bush, supra. However, it seems fully in keeping with his transformational
approach to mediation. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOwERMENT AND
RECOGNITION (1994).
23. At the symposium, many, but not all, lamented the common settlement focus in
court-annexed mediation programs. For critiques, see Bush, supra note 22; Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001). For those
who think the term "assisted settlement conferences" more aptly describes the
happenings within such court-annexed programs than does "mediations," part of the
distaste may stem from the possible failure of such mediations, or assisted settlement
conferences, to significantly foster values like respect, responsibility, and dialogue. See,
e.g., Bush, supra note 22, at 20 ("If we argue for [court-annexed] mediation now solely
on the grounds of efficiency and private benefits, then even if mediation succeeds in
these dimensions, the educational dimension may never fully develop.").
24. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
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particular case, but also broadly. The dispute resolution institution
embodies, and thus may impart, the traits in deficit that helped give rise
to the dispute.
In analyzing dispute resolution mechanisms, we should consider not
only the first-order, immediate questions of conflict resolution, but also
the second-order, long-run questions of conflict prevention. For
example, when assessing mediation, we should ask not only, "Was a
settlement reached?" but also, "Did the parties find a way of relating to
one another that will help prevent future conflicts (with either one
another or others) and help them handle those conflicts that do arise?, 25
Similar issues apply to other dispute resolution processes.26 As Nancy
Welsh so aptly writes:
Ultimately... [dispute resolution] processes are meant to do more
than resolve discrete disputes. They are meant to resolve disputes in
a manner that will serve the goal of dispute prevention. The courts
do this through the provision of a procedurally-just process and the
creation of precedent. Perhaps mediation (at least facilitative,
dialogue-based mediation) does it through the assertion of and
training in appropriate ways for people to relate to each other when
they find themselves in a dispute.
IV. Conclusion
While some level of conflict within most any society is inevitable, I
do not think we should take the level of conflict within our society as a
mere given. When we look back at our field generations from now, we
will not be able to say that we have truly succeeded unless our services
are rarely needed, unless we have been largely put out of business. Key
to that is the growth of respect, responsibility, and dialogue within our
society. Before that time, however, we can view a dispute resolution
mechanism like mediation in part as a form of social education, seeking
to introduce respect, responsibility, and dialogue where they are lacking.
The lens of the ideal can help us see that for which we should ultimately
strive and help us understand what we now do, and should do.
25. More colloquially, the question is not just whether an agreement was reached,
but whether it will last.
26. For example, a judge who disposes of a case disrespectfully would be rightly
criticized as compared with one who does so respectfully. Though the immediate
disposition is the same, the second-order lesson is quite different.
27. Email from Nancy A. Welsh, Associate Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania
State University Dickinson School of Law, to Jonathan R. Cohen, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law (Apr. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
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